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MARC A. ABBOTT 
MEMBER 
JOHN T. MITCHELL 
MEMBER 
April 25, 2002 
Albany, New York 
9:30 A.M. 
PRESENT: MICHAEL R. CUEVAS, Chairman 
MARC A. ABBOTT, Member 
. JOHN T. MITCHELL, Member 
Staff: Robert DePaula, Deputy Chairman & Counsel 
Deborah A. Sabin, Assistant Counsel to the Board 
Christine White, Acting Secretary to the Board 
1. Minutes of the Board Meeting on March 26, 2002 approved. 
2. Board Decision and Orders 
A. CP-757 & CP-758 - District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Professional Staff 
Congress of the City University of New York and Research Foundation of the City 
University of New York and the City University of New York and United Automobile, 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 2110 
B. U-22120 - Peekskill Police Association and City of Peekskill and Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO 
C. U-22716 - Town of Yorktown and Town of Yorktown Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
D. U-21928 - John Zito and United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, NYSUT, AFL-CIO 
and Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
E. U-20907, U-20987, U-21001, U-21005, U-21006 & U-21010 - Buffalo Police Benevolent 
Association & City of Buffalo 
3. Board Certifications 
A. C-5161 - Teamsters Local #264 and Holland Central School District and Holland Support 
Staff Association, NEA/NY 
B. C-5188 - Teamsters Locai 294, international Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO and 
Town of Cairo 
The next meeting of the Board will be held on June 12, 2002 in New York City. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Christine White 
Acting Secretary to the Board 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
80 WOLF ROAD 
ALBANY, NEW YORK 12205-2604 
TEL: (518)457-2578 
FAX: (518) 457-2664 
MICHAEL R. CUEVAS 
CHAIRMAN 
MINUTES OF THE BOARD MEETING 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-757 
RESEARCH FOUNDATION OF THE CITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK and THE CITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employers, 
-and-
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE and 
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS, 
AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2110, 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS OF THE 
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-758 
RESEARCH FOUNDATION OF THE CITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK and THE CITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employers, 
-and-
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE and 
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS, 
AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2110, 
Intervenor. 
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JOEL GILLER, ESQ. (MARY J. O'CONNELL of counsel), for District 
Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (IRWIN BLUESTEIN of counsel), 
for Professional Staff Congress of the City University of New York 
LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. (DAVID R. MARSHALL and DANIEL A. GRITTI 
of counsel), for Research Foundation of The City University of New York 
FREDERICK P. SCHAFFER, GENERAL COUNSEL (KATHERINE RAYMOND 
of counsel), for The City University of New York 
LEVY, RATNER & BEHROOZI, P.C. (PAMELA JEFFREY of counsel), for 
Intervenor 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (DC-37) and the Professional Staff 
Congress of the City University of New York (PSC) have filed exceptions, in their 
respective matters above referenced, to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) adjourning sine die the processing of their petitions for unit clarification/ 
placement. The United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers, 
AFL-CIO, Local 2110 (UAW) has intervened in these petitions. 
EXCEPTIONS 
DC-37 has excepted to the ALJ's interim decision on legal and factual grounds, 
including that the ALJ's decision was contrary to the New York State Administrative 
Procedure Act (SAPA), §301 and the decision prejudices the affected employees. 
PSC has excepted to the ALJ's interim decision on legal and factual grounds 
and, specifically, that the ALJ exceeded his authority. 
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The UAW, the City University of New York (CUNY) and the Research 
Foundation of the City University of New York (RF) have submitted responses to the 
exceptions, supporting the ALJ's ruling. 
FACTS 
On June 18, 2001, DC-37 filed a unit clajificajion/placenrient petition (CP-757), 
which seeks a determination that certain full-time and part-time, non-instructional 
employees of RF are in titles either presently represented by DC-37 and, therefore, 
encompassed in its existing white-collar bargaining unit of employees at CUNY, or are 
in unrepresented titles which could be appropriately placed in that unit. DC-37 named 
both RF and CUNY as the employer. UAW was named in the petition as an employee 
organization that might be affected by the petition. 
RF, CUNY and UAW filed separate responses and, among the defenses 
raised, was PERB's lack of jurisdiction. 
Also, on June 18, 2001, PSC filed a similar petition (CP-758), which seeks a 
determination that certain instructional employees of RF are either in titles represented 
by PSC and, therefore, encompassed in its existing bargaining unit of employees at 
CUNY, or are in unrepresented titles which could be appropriately placed in that unit. 
PSC also named both RF and CUNY as the employer. The UAW and DC-37 were 
named in the petition as employee organizations that might be affected by the petition. 
RF, CUNY and UAW filed separate responses and raised the same defenses 
as in CP-757. 
The ALJ was apprised of a representation petition that involves RF and UAW 
before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). On September 1, 2000, the 
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Regional Director of the NLRB issued a decision, concluding that "RF is exempt from 
NLRB jurisdiction by virtue of being a political subdivision upon Section 2 (2) of the 
Act."1 The ALJ noted that the Regional Director's decision is presently on appeal to 
the NLRB. The ALJ also noted that PSC alleged in its papers that the NLRB had 
granted_reyjewqn_March^2 
At the conference held on December 10, 2001, DC-37 and PSC urged the ALJ 
to process the instant CP petitions. Conversely, UAW, RF and CUNY urged the ALJ 
to adjourn the proceedings until the NLRB issued its final determination on jurisdiction. 
After reviewing the parties' written briefs, the ALJ decided to place the instant petitions 
on hold pending the final determination of the NLRB on the representation petition. 
PSC and DC-37 have taken exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ adjourned the processing of the unit clarification/placement petitions 
until the NLRB decides the jurisdictional issue. We agree. 
As a general rule, this Board will not review the interlocutory 
determinations of the Director or an Administrative Law Judge 
1NLRB Case No. 26-RC-8187, p. 14. 
2PERB takes official notice of the improper practice charge, U-22025, filed by 
UAW on October 12, 2000 against RF in which the UAW alleges that "While the Union 
filed its representation petition before the National Labor Relations Board, as opposed 
to PERB, the RF's employees are protected from retaliation for their activities in 
attempting to form a Union under the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act as well 
as the National Labor Relations Act." The parties in that proceeding have agreed to 
place that charge on hold until a decision of the NLRB regarding jurisdiction is received. 
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until such time as all proceedings below have been concluded, 
and review may be had of the entire matter.3 
* * * 
The purpose of that policy is to prevent the delay inherent in the 
piecemeal review of proceedings, and to prevent the prejudice 
and inefficient use of administrative resource that can result from 
such piecemeal review.4 
* * * 
It is only when extraordinary circumstances are present and/or in 
which severe prejudice would otherwise result if interlocutory 
review were denied that we will entertain a request for such 
review.5 
DC-37 and PSC have offered no evidence of any irreparable harm which they 
might suffer if these cases were put on hold and a final determination made by an ALJ 
only after the NLRB has decided the appeal of the Regional Director's decision on 
jurisdiction. 
DC-37 argues in its brief that "[T]he workers of RF/CUNY will be prejudiced 
because they will be deprived of the fundamental, constitutionally guaranteed right to 
organize and bargain collectively." While the ALJ's decision to put these cases on 
hold will result in the matters not being further processed for some span of time, the 
ALJ's decision avoids the possibility of inconsistent determinations and the possibility 
of further litigation over the jurisdictional issue. It is the lack of finality that would delay 
3County of Nassau, 22 PERB1J3027, at 3066 (1989). 
^United Federation of Teachers, Local 2 and New York State United Teachers, 
32 PERB 1J3071 at 3167 (1999). 
5County of Nassau, supra note 3; see also Mt. Morris Cent. Sch. Dist, 26 PERB 
113085(1993). 
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and, perhaps, deprive these employees of their right to organize and bargain 
collectively, and not any particular forum. 
PSC argues in its brief that the NLRB Regional Director found "that RF/CUNY 
was a public employer." Consequently, "the employees at issue cannot obtain 
representational rights; through the processes of the N ^ This argument also lacks 
merit because it assumes that the status of RF and CUNY as either public or private 
entities is not being reviewed on appeal to the NLRB. It is only after the NLRB appeal 
process has been exhausted, that the at-issue employees may look to PERB to 
adjudicate their representational rights if the NLRB has determined that it does not 
have jurisdiction. Any other approach would frustrate the policies of the Act and result 
in an inefficient use of administrative resources of two agencies. 
Balancing the possible prejudice and inefficiencies associated with each course 
of action available to us, we choose, in our discretion, not to entertain this interlocutory 
appeal. 
Based upon the foregoing, DC-37's and PSC's interlocutory exceptions are 
dismissed without prejudice to their right to appeal the ALJ's decision to adjourn the 
instant petitions for unit clarification/placement upon exceptions, if any, to the ALJ's 
final determination. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: April 25, 2002 
Albany, New York 
I R. Cuevas, Chairman 
A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PEEKSKILL POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22120 
CITY OF PEEKSKILL, 
Respondent, 
-and-
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN 
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
JOHN K. GRANT, ESQ., for Charging Party 
GROTTA, GLASSMAN & HOFFMAN, P.A. (DAVID M. WIRTZ 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BRIAN M. LUCYK, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ), finding a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), on an improper practice charge filed by the Peekskill Police 
Association (Association) alleging that the City of Peekskill (City) violated the Act when 
it unilaterally altered the noncontractual practice of offering dispatching duties to police 
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officers on an overtime basis. The City's answer generally denied the allegations and 
affirmatively alleged, inter alia, that it had no duty to negotiate over the alleged 
unilateral change in practice because dispatching duties were not exclusive to the 
Association. Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO (Teamsters), the representative of 
the employees who perform the at-issue work in the civilian title of police dispatcher, 
intervened. 
Exceptions 
The City's exceptions relate generally to the ALJ's decision on the law and the 
facts and, more specifically, address the ALJ's finding that the City unilaterally changed 
the order in which dispatchers were assigned to work overtime. 
The Teamsters except to the ALJ's decision on the law and the facts and, more 
specifically, to the ALJ's findings that cases with respect to the employer's right to 
transfer nonexclusive unit work to nonunit personnel were not relevant and that the 
manner in which the overtime work was "doled out" is a term and condition of 
employment and, therefore, mandatorily negotiable, rather than a management 
prerogative. 
The Association argued in its response to the exceptions that the ALJ was 
correct in his findings and conclusions of law. The Association, however, filed cross-
exceptions alleging that the ALJ erred in finding that it did not have exclusivity over the 
dispatching duties, that the City's obligation to bargain existed only as long as the City 
elected to have police officers do dispatch work, and that there is no support in the 
record for the City's stated reason for changing the procedure. 
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The City argued in its response to the Association's cross-exceptions that the 
ALJ was correct in finding no exclusivity and the record amply demonstrates the need 
for the change. 
The Teamsters argued in response to the Association's cross-exceptions that the 
ALJ was correct in finding nonexclusivity, and that there is support in the record for the 
change. 
FACTS 
The Association is the certified bargaining representative for police officers and 
sergeants employed by the City. The Teamsters represent a civilian unit containing, 
among other titles, police dispatchers, community service workers and park rangers. 
The Association called only one witness, Sergeant Joseph Gomez, who testified 
that he has been employed in the department for seventeen and one-half years. He 
was promoted to patrol sergeant in 1994. During his tenure in the department, he has 
been employed as a police dispatcher, patrolman and patrol sergeant. His testimony 
reveals that the City has, during that time, assigned overtime dispatching duties to 
employees in the units represented by the Association and the Teamsters. The order of 
the assignment to the employees in the two units has changed at least twice during his 
tenure and before the at-issue change in order of assignment of overtime dispatching. 
The record is unclear, however, as to the manner in which the assignments were made 
during the last several years since the City's last change in 1995 in the order of 
assignment. Gomez testified to several different permutations in the manner of 
assigning dispatching overtime, including, inter alia, the length of the shift assigned, the 
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use of on-duty personnel in both units as opposed to off-duty personnel, and the 
significance of seniority in making the assignment of Association unit employees. 
The City's only witness, James Madaffari, City Manager and Commissioner of 
Public Safety, testified that there was a change in the manner of assignment sometime 
in199E> or 11996 wheni the on-duty police dispatcher wasi_given the right of first refusal to 
overtime dispatch work, and that changed the system in place at that time whereby 
overtime dispatch work was first offered to police officers. Madaffari also testified that, 
as of October 2000, more dispatching work was offered to the Teamsters' unit 
members than had been previously offered. 
Our review of the record testimony reveals that, for the past ten to twelve years 
referred to by the parties, the procedures for overtime dispatching have been 
inconsistent and have been altered by the City as its staffing needs have changed. The 
practice by which the City determines the employees to whom the overtime 
assignments will be offered, as well as the order in which the assignment of overtime 
dispatching is made available to City employees, is not clearly set forth either in the 
witnesses' testimony or the charge.1 
Paragraph 5E of the details of charge states the following: 
For many years, any overtime the City authorized or required 
of a dispatcher was first offered to the dispatcher on duty. If 
the dispatcher did not want the overtime assignment, the 
City offered the overtime to police officers in the 
Association's unit on a reverse seniority basis (most senior 
first). The City would then offer the overtime to non-unit 
employees only if all police officers refused the overtime. 
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DISCUSSION 
The City argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding that the City 
violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. We agree. We do not find on this record that the 
Association has met its burden of establishing an unequivocal past practice with respect 
to tjie order of assignment of police officers to dispatching overtime. We have 
established precedents defining the charging party's burden of proof in a charge 
alleging a unilateral change in a past practice. In such a case it must be established, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a past practice regarding a 
mandatory subject of negotiations and then established that a unilateral change in the 
past practice has occurred.2 It is well settled that, in order to demonstrate the existence 
of a past practice, a charging party must prove that the practice "was unequivocal and 
was continued uninterrupted for a period of time sufficient under the circumstances 
[footnote omitted] to create a reasonable expectation among the affected employees 
that the [practice] would continue."3 
The procedures for the assignment of overtime work affect hours and 
compensation, which are mandatory subjects of negotiations.4 We, therefore, must 
test whether the charging party has demonstrated an unequivocal practice with respect 
2See State of New York (PEF), 33 PERB 1J3024 (2000); Farmingdale Union Free 
Sch. Dist, 7 PERB 1J3056 (1974). 
3County of Westchester, 33 PERB P025, at 3068 (2000); County of Nassau, 24 
PERB ^3029 (1991). 
4See Village of Mamaronack Police Benevolent Ass'n, 22 PERB fl3029 (1989); 
City of Schenectady, 22 PERB 1T3018 (1989), aff'g, 21 PERB 1J4605 (1988). 
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to this mandatory subject that continued uninterrupted for a significant period of time, 
such that the employees could reasonably expect the practice to continue unchanged.5 
At best, Gomez's testimony presented a conflicting interpretation of the alleged 
practice as set forth in paragraph 5E of the Association's charge. The record reflects at 
least two changes in the order of assignmentofdispatchingovertime jn the C[ty's 
procedure. Further, within the changes in the order of assignment, there existed several 
inconsistent variations in the manner in which this overtime was assigned, each 
dependent on the City's needs and the available personnel at any given time. We do 
not find, on this record, that the Association established an unequivocal practice by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Given the inconsistencies in the procedure used by the City to make overtime 
dispatching assignments, we further find that the Association did not establish that 
there was a reasonable expectation that the practice would continue unchanged. Thus, 
the Association must be considered to have failed in meeting its burden of proof and 
the charge must, therefore, be dismissed.6 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the City's exceptions, deny the exceptions filed 
by the Teamsters, deny the cross-exceptions filed by the Association, and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. 
5Bellmore Union Free Sch. Dist, 34 PERB |f3009 (2001); County of Nassau, 
supra notel 2. 
6See Bellmore, supra note 15; Schalmont Cent. Sch. Dist, 29 PERB TJ3036 
(1996). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: April 25, 2002 
Albany, New York 
ael R. Cuevas,.Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
/ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF YORKTOWN, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASENO.U-22716 
TOWN OF YORKTOWN POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent. 
WINSTON & STRAWN (DEBORAH S. K. JAGODA of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
) BUNYAN & BAUMGARTNER (RICHARD P. BUNYAN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Yorktown (Town) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge 
filed by the Town alleging that the Town of Yorktown Police Benevolent Association, 
Inc. (Association) had violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by including nonmandatory subjects of bargaining in its petition for interest 
arbitration. 
The charge involves three of the demands submitted by the Association in its 
petition for interest arbitration. The ALJ decided the case on the language of the 
) 
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demands, denying the Town's request for a hearing as to the Association's intent and 
the Town's objection to one demand. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Town excepts to the ALJ's characterization of the record as a "stipulation of 
facts" in light of the ALJ's denial of its request for a limited hearing and the ALJ's 
determination that the charge would be decided on the pleadings and the stipulation of 
facts submitted by the parties. The Town further excepts to the ALJ's determination that 
the three at-issue demands are mandatory subjects of negotiation. The Association 
supports the ALJ's decision, except that the Association has no objection to the 
correction of the characterization of the charge as being submitted for decision on a 
stipulation of facts. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
The case was decided by the ALJ on a stipulated record prepared by the parties. 
However, we here clarify the ALJ's decision to the extent that it does not reflect that the 
Town requested a hearing on one of the demands and the ALJ determined that no 
hearing was necessary because the charge could be decided on the language of the 
demand. There was no issue of fact raised by the Town which required a hearing.1 
Indeed, the Town does not except to the ALJ's determination that no hearing was 
1See Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 21 PERB 1J3022 (1988). 
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necessary, only that the ALJ's decision did not reflect that the Town sought a hearing 
on the intent of one of the demands. 
FACTS 
The language of each demand is set forth below, in the discussion on the 
mandatory or nonmandatoiy nature of th 
DISCUSSION 
The Association proposed that a new section, numbered 7, be added to Article 
III, Compensation, of the parties' agreement.2 The proposal is: 
All members of the bargaining unit assigned to patrol shall 
work a 4-day on 2-day off schedule which consists of steady 
shifts. The steady shifts shall consist of steady day tour, 
8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.; steady evening tour, 4:00 p.m. to 12 
midnight and steady midnight tour 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. 
No member of the bargaining unit assigned to patrol shall 
work more than 242 days per year. In addition, those 
members of the bargaining unit assigned to SPO or Relief 
Squad shall work no more than 236 days per year. 
The ALJ found that the demand involves hours of work in its several 
components, rejecting the Town's argument that, even if some of the components were 
mandatory subjects of negotiation, in combination, the demand becomes 
nonmandatoiy. The Town argues in its exceptions that the demand is a unitary 
proposal which must be found to be nonmandatory because it interferes with the 
Town's managerial prerogatives to determine the level of services it will provide and to 
set staffing levels. 
2The parties' last negotiations concluded with the issuance of an interest 
arbitration award for two years, commencing January 1, 1999. 
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In Village of Mamaroneck Police Benevolent Association,3 we held, relying upon 
our decision in Town of Blooming Grove,4 that, while 
the right of the Town to establish its manpower needs by 
establishing levels of coverage for each day of the week 
constitutes a management prerogative about which the Town 
was not obligated to bargain [footnote omitted],"an employer 
is obligated to negotiate the method by which its manpower 
needs will be met in terms of tours of duty. (See also City of 
White Plains, 5 PERB 1J3008 (1982); City of Buffalo, 14 
PERB 1[3053 (1981). The length of the employees' work year 
and tours of duty are mandatory subjects of bargaining." 
Here, as in Mamaroneck, supra, the demand seeks to set the number of days 
worked per year, as well as the hours of the shifts. We have consistently held that 
management prerogatives are the determination of levels, days, and hours of coverage 
to be required, while the manner in which employees will be assigned to provide that 
coverage is mandatorily negotiable, if alternative ways of providing coverage exist. That 
this demand has several components, all of which are mandatory,5 does not compel a 
contrary conclusion. 
322 PERB P029, at 3072 (1989). 
421 PERB U3032, at 3069 (1988). 
5Hours of work are a mandatory subject of bargaining. Act, §§201 and 204.3. 
Tours of duty and shift assignments are components of hours of work and are, 
therefore, mandatorily negotiable. City of White Plains, 5 PERB 1J3008 (1972); City of 
Schenectady, 21 PERB 1J4605 (1988), aff'd, 22 PERB K3018 (1989). Also mandatory 
are the number of days worked per year, Addison Cent. Sch. Dist., 17 PERB U4566, 
aff'd, 17 PERB 1T3076 (1984): the specific days worked per week, Starpoint Cent. Sch. 
Dist, 23 PERB 1(3012 (1990); the number of days worked per tour, Local 294, IBT, 10 
PERB 1J3007 (1977); and the hours or type of tours, City of Buffalo, 14 PERB 1J3053 
(1981). The starting and ending time of shifts as well as the number of shifts is 
mandatorily negotiable, County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff, 27 PERB 
113019(1994). 
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The second Association proposal seeks to amend Article XV, Section 1, 
Miscellaneous, to add the following language to which the Town objects: 
The Town shall notify the Association at least three (3) 
months in advance of any change in working methods or 
working conditions, except where such change is required 
because of an emergency or major disaster over which the 
Town...has; no control...Nothing [n this Section shall be 
construed as a waiver by the Association of its right to 
negotiate such changes....6 
The change in this proposal from the language in the parties' agreement is the 
increase in the time for notification from seven days, as the agreement currently 
provides, to three months and the addition of the second sentence.7 The Town 
articulates the theory that the contract provision is mandatory because the contractual 
notice period of seven days is reasonable. The Town argues, however, that the 
expanded notification period proposed by the Association in its demand is unreasonable 
and, therefore, nonmandatory. The ALJ found that the contract provision itself is 
nonmandatory because it is too restrictive in that it only permits the Town to change 
working conditions and methods without advance notification in those emergency 
circumstances over which the Town has no control. Having found that the contract 
provision is nonmandatory, the ALJ applied the "conversion theory of negotiations" 
The concluding language of the proposal, "or the impact of such changes", is 
not at-issue. 
7The ALJ found the second sentence to be nonmandatory as it could be read as 
imposing a negotiations duty regarding nonmandatory subjects of bargaining. Neither 
party has excepted to the ALJ's decision on this point. 
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articulated in City of Cohoes (hereafter, Cohoes),s which renders the contract provision 
mandatory as between these parties. Finding that the Association's proposal seeks to 
modify the contract provision, the ALJ rejected the Town's interpretation of the decision 
in City of White Plains.9 There, the ALJ determined that the conversion theory applies to 
nonmandatory matters already in the contract, but it does not convert nonmandatory 
demands into mandatory topics merely because they are to be added to a mandatory 
subject matter in a contract. We affirmed the ALJ on different grounds. 
Here, the ALJ correctly determined that the contract provision sought to be 
modified was an otherwise nonmandatory subject of negotiation, rendered mandatory by 
Cohoes. As the Association's proposal is specifically related to the contract provision, it, 
too, is mandatory.10 Cohoes was intended to give parties an avenue to address 
contractual provisions which deal with nonmandatory subjects of negotiations. Not only 
does it provide parties with the means to argue at interest arbitration that a contract 
provision dealing with a nonmandatory subject should be removed, it is also a tool to 
modify nonmandatory contract provisions, as long as the proposed modification is 
reasonably related to specific language of the nonmandatory contract provision. As the 
ALJ noted, "the focus of a Cocoes-based analysis should be on the specificity of 
relationship between the proposal and the contract provision and not on a difference 
831 PERB 1J3020 (1998), conf'd, 32 PERB 1J7026 (Sup.Ct. Albany County), aff'd, 
276 AD2d 184, 33 PERB 1J7019 (3d Dep't 2000), motion for leave to appeal denied, 96 
NY2d 711, 34 PERB H7018 (2001). 
933 PERB 1J4588, aff'd, 33 PERB 1J3051 (2000). 
™Cohoes, supra note 7, at 3038. 
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between their independent status as negotiable items."11 That is the reasonable 
interpretation of Cohoes and effectuates the fundamental policies of the Act. 
The final proposal objected to by the Town is the Association's demand that a 
new article, Minimum Manpower, be added to the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement, as follows: 
In the event the composition of this bargaining unit is 
diminished all members of the bargaining unit shall receive a 
stipend of one-thousand ($1,000) dollars per member. 
The Town argues that the demand amounts to a penalty designed to prevent the 
Town from exercising its managerial prerogative to reduce the size of its police force. 
"[A] demand is improper if it sets up a system of penalties primarily designed to prohibit 
the public employer from exercising its statutory responsibilities even if, on its face, the 
demand is for premium pay."12 But, under the Town's definition, all premium pay 
proposals could be viewed as penalties because they exact an amount of money from 
the employer for the exercise of what is otherwise a management prerogative.13 The 
inquiry is whether the demand bears "no reasonable relationship to a particular hazard 
or to other circumstances affecting working conditions which it is designed to 
compensate."14 As the reduction in workforce contemplated by the demand could, 
"Town ofYorktown Police Benevolent Ass'n Inc., 35 PERB 1J4515, at 4550 n.15 
(2002). 
^Village of Spring Valley Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, 14 PERB 1J3010, at 
3017(1981). 
13See Lynbrook Police Benevolent Ass'n, 10 PERB |f3067 (1977). 
uVillage of Spring Valley, supra note 6, at 3017. 
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among other things, result in an increased workload for the remaining unit employees, it 
cannot be said that the demand amounts to a penalty.15 It is, therefore, mandatory.16 
In reaching our conclusion that the aforementioned demands are mandatory 
subjects of negotiations, we are not deciding the merits of the demands, only their 
negotiability. Our decision herein should only be construed as a determination that the 
demands may properly be submitted to arbitration. 
Based on the foregoing, the Town's exceptions are denied, except to the extent 
that we have clarified the ALJ's characterization of the stipulated record, and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: April 25, 2002 
Albany, New York 
^^^^^^^^X^^^C^-C-*-
)hn T. Mitchell, Member 
15The Town's reliance on Prue v. City of Syracuse, 25 PERB fl7539 (Sup. Ct 
Tioga County 1992), rev'd, 201 AD2d 894, 27 PERB 1J7502 (4th Dep't 1994), is 
misplaced. The Supreme Court, Tioga County, vacated an arbitrator's award that the 
City of Syracuse pay a retroactive salary increase if there were any layoffs of unit 
employees, finding that such a proposal was a penalty. The Appellate Division reversed 
the Supreme Court on the law, as well as on other grounds not here relevant, finding 
that the arbitrator's award had a rational basis and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
(1997). 
16See Fulton Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 3063, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 30 PERB U3012 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charging party, John Zito, has moved this Board to reconsider our decision 
and order previously issued on August 16, 2001.1 The respondent, United Federation 
of Teachers, Locai 2, AFT, NYSUT, AFL-CiO (UFT), has opposed the motion. The 
'UFT, Local 2, AFT, NYSUT, AFL-CIO (Zito), 34 PERB P029 (2001). 
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employer, the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(Board of Education), has not responded. 
Zito alleged that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by not processing a grievance that Zito had filed against the 
Board of Education, 
On the instant motion to reconsider the Board's determination in this matter, Zito 
is essentially alleging a new violation of the Act based on evidence not available when 
the underlying charge was filed and decided by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
Zito complains that a conflict of interest arose when he filed an improper practice 
charge against UFT and, thereafter, sought legal representation from UFT in an appeal 
brought by the Board of Education to reverse an arbitrator's award which favored Zito. 
This new allegation, couched as a breach of UFT's duty of fair representation, is 
supported by correspondence and, specifically, a letter from UFT dated May 25, 2001, 
in which counsel for UFT advised Zito that outside counsel had been retained to 
represent him because UFT recognized that a potential for a conflict of interest existed. 
The Board has granted motions to reopen proceedings on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence.2 We have followed the rationale articulated in Evans v. 
Monaghan, 306 NY 312, 326 (1954), in which the Court of Appeals applied "the law of 
newly discovered evidence"3 to administrative determinations where it could be done in 
conformity with the limitations which the courts have imposed upon themselves. 
2City of Poughkeepsie, 18 PERB 1J3066 (1985). 
3Adjunct Faculty Ass'n, 18 PERB P076, at 3164 (1985). 
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The courts have imposed two limitations on granting applications to reopen 
based upon newly-discovered evidence. The first is to refuse to reopen proceedings 
when, with due diligence, the new evidence was obtainable before the close of the 
original trial. The second is that it must be demonstrated that the evidence, "if 
introduced at a trial, would probably have produced a different result."4 
Applying these two limitations to the instant application leads us to deny Zito's 
motion to reconsider. Zito argued the conflict of interest issue in his original exceptions 
to the Board but, because the issue had not been argued in the case before the ALJ, 
we declined to consider it in our earlier decision. Now, seven months later, Zito is 
attempting to reopen his case in order to raise the conflict of interest issue. Upon his 
own admission, the basis for this claim is found in the correspondence with UFT and, 
specifically, their letter of May 25, 2001. Zito, therefore, sat on his rights and failed to 
make a reasonably prompt application to reopen his case before the ALJ. 
Consequently, his motion to reopen must be denied. 
In applying the second limitation, we find that the introduction of evidence, if 
timely, probably would not have produced a different result from our prior holding. The 
underlying improper practice charge alleged a violation of the duty of fair representation 
by UFT in the processing of a grievance filed by Zito. UFT's May 25, 2001 letter 
recognized the potential conflict of interest problem and provided Zito with outside 
counsel for a defense of the Board of Education's application to reverse the arbitration 
4/d. 
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award in Zito's favor. Thus, the introduction of this evidence would not warrant a 
contrary finding. 
Having reviewed the moving papers, we determine that there is neither such 
newly discovered material nor overlooked propositions of law to justify reconsideration 
of our Decision and Order issued over seven and one-half months ago, on August 16, 
2001.5 Zito is attempting to resurrect, through this motion to reconsider, an improper 
practice charge that is otherwise time-barred under our Rules of Procedure (Rules).6 
Accordingly, the motion for reconsideration is denied.7 SO ORDERED. 
DATED: April 25, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ 
j/ Mjarcft. Abtott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
5See Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist. 25 PERB ff3027 (1992); New York City 
Transit Auth., 24 PERB 1J3030 (1991); Town ofBrookhaven, 19 PERB Tf3010 (1986). 
6Rules, §204.1 (a)(1). 
7See United Fed'n of Teachers (Freedman), 34 PERB P005 (2001). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated September 28, 2001, the Appellate Division, Fourth 
Department, affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, our decision in Buffalo Police 
Benevolent Association.'1 The Court remitted the matters to us for imposition of an 
appropriate remedy in accordance with its decision.2 Our motion to reargue having been 
denied by the Fourth Department,3 we now modify our remedy as directed bythe court. 
Our decision found that the Buffalo Police Benevolent Association (PBA) violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it disseminated 
false and/or misleading information concerning the status of pending grievances and 
improper practice charges to unit members. The court reversed this finding, holding that 
the PBA's "mistake, negligence or incompetence with respect to the dissemination of 
133 PERB H3060 (2000). 
2Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass'n v. PERB, 34 PERB ff7031 (4th Dep't 2001). 
^Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass'n v. PERB, 35 PERB fl 7007 (4th Dep't 2002). 
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that information is not a sufficient basis"4 for a finding that the PBA breached its duty of 
fair representation because there was not substantial evidence that the PBA was acting 
in a manner that was arbitrary, discriminatory or motivated by bad faith. 
We also determined that the PBA breached its duty of fair representation by 
intervening in a CPLR article 78 proceeding commenced by the charging parties, 
Marvin V. Sanford, Richard D. Woods, Johnnie A. Fritz, Jr., Tomar Hubbard, Bradford 
Pitts and Robert W. Yeates, challenging the civil service examination for the position of 
detective in the City of Buffalo Police Department (City). The court found that the 
position asserted by the PBA was against the interests of Sanford, Woods and Fritz 
insofar as the PBA argued that article 24 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) 
is not applicable to them. At the time of that proceeding, the PBA was representing 
those charging parties on grievances alleging that they were tenured under article 24 of 
the CBA. The PBA was also pursuing class action grievances (GR98-14 and 
GR98-267) on behalf of all detectives employed by the City in that position for more 
than eighteen months. The court found that although the PBA had a legitimate reason 
for intervening in that proceeding, it was not necessary for the PBA to assert the 
inapplicability of article 24 of the CBA. The court found that the PBA's assertion of that 
position in the Article 78 proceeding was evidence of arbitrariness, if not bad faith, and 
sustained our finding that the PBA had violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act. However, the 
court found that because Hubbard, Pitts and Yeates had not filed grievances based on 
article 24 of the CBA, our determination that the PBA had breached its duty of fair 
representation with respect to them must be annulled. 
ASupra note 2, at 7049. 
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Consistent with the Fourth Department's decision in these matters, we find that 
the charge must be and hereby are dismissed as to the allegation that the PBA violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Act by furnishing unit employees with false and inaccurate 
information about the status of pending grievances and improper practice charges. Our 
order that the PBA cease and desist from disseminating false and/or misleading 
information regarding pending grievances and improper practice charges to its 
membership is hereby rescinded. 
As to the allegations that the PBA violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act when it 
intervened in the Article 78 proceeding brought by Hubbard, Pitts and Yeates, we 
hereby dismiss the charges as to those allegations and rescind that part of our order 
that directed the PBA to reimburse Hubbard, Pitts and Yeates for any and all 
reasonable legal costs and related expenses which they incurred in connection with the 
Article 78 proceedings brought in March 1999 against the City and the Buffalo Municipal 
Civil Service Commission. We also rescind so much of our order that directed the PBA 
and the City to immediately move GR98-14 and GR98-267 (the class action 
grievances) to arbitration, and that the PBA incur the costs for the hiring of outside 
counsel to represent Sanford, Woods, Fritz, Hubbard, Pitts and Yeates in those 
proceedings. 
WE, THEREFORE, ORDER that: 
1. The PBA reimburse Officers Sanford, Woods, and Fritz for any and all 
reasonable legal costs and related expenses which they incurred in 
connection with the Article 78 proceedings brought in March 1999 against 
the City of Buffalo and the Buffalo Municipal Civil Service Commission. 
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2. The PBA and the City immediately move grievances GR98-307, 
GR98-301, and GR99-2 to arbitration, and that the PBA incur the costs for 
the hiring of outside counsel to represent Sanford, Woods and Fritz in 
these proceedings. 
3. The PBA sign and post the attached notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post written communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: April 25, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
) PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Buffalo (City) in the unit represented by Buffalo Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) that: 
1. The PBA will reimburse Officers Sanford, Woods, and Fritz for any and all reasonable legal 
costs and related expenses which they incurred in connection with the Article 78 proceedings 
brought in March 1999 against the City of Buffalo and the Buffalo Municipal Civil Service 
Commission. 
2. The PBA and the City will immediately move grievances GR98-307, GR98-301, and GR99-2 
to arbitration, and that the PBA will incur the costs for the hiring of outside counsel to 
•' represent Sanford, Woods and Fritz in these proceedings. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
City of Buffalo 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Buffalo Police Benevolent Association 
] .Mice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other 
material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
') 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL #264, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5161 
HOLLAND CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
HOLLAND SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local #264 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
J 
Certification - C-5161 page 2 
Included: Account Clerk Typist, Auto Mechanic, Auto Mechanic Crew Chief, Bus 
Attendant, Bus Driver, Cleaner, Clerk, Clerk-Typist, Cook, Cook Manager, 
Custodian, Food Service Helper, Head Grounds Worker, Grounds 
Worker, Head Bus Driver, Laborer, Laborer/Courier, Maintenance 
Mechanic Crew Chief, Maintenance Mechanic Helper, Painter, Registered 
Professional Nurse, School Monitor, Senior Account Clerk, Senior Clerk 
Typist, Teacher Aide, Offset Machine Operator. 
Excluded; School Business Administrator, Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds, 
Transportation Supervisor (or Equivalent Position), Senior Account 
Clerk/District Treasurer, Secretary to the Superintendent of Schools/ 
District Clerk, Food Service Manager, Payroll Clerk, and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall negotiate 
collectively with the Teamsters Local #264. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does 
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 25, 2002 
Albany, New York 
^h^U^R^^^-
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
ohn T. Mitchell, Membe 
A STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5188 
TOWN OF CAIRO, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be 
appropriate and described beiow, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5188 page 2 
Included: All full-time and part-time highway department employees 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent and all other employees 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 25, 2002 
Albany, New York 
ael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
